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insurer-insured privilege extension of the attorney-client privilege, is clearly unsound.
State ex rel. Cain v. Barker extends the attorney-client privilege to
include statements transmitted from insured to insurer where there is an
insurer-insured relationship at the time of the statements. The extension is
designed to protect the policy holder, whose defense is conducted by an
attorney selected by his insurer, and to encourage full disclosure to the
insurer. Both reasons are sound and desirable in terms of public policy. In
view of the distinction between the attorney-client privilege and the physician-patient privilege, however, it would seem the court may have to
reconsider its dicta involving waiver should it be faced with a case in which
it is argued that the attorney-client privilege has been waived merely
because the plaintiff bringing a lawsuit is the one claiming the privilege. To
hold to the Cain dicta would bring about the anomalous result of excluding
all clients who wish to bring an action from the benefits of the privilege of
confidentiality in communications with their attorneys.
ROBERT S. HYATT

HABEAS CORPUS-USE OF THE WRIT IN MISSOURI
STATE COURTS TO CHALLENGE
PRISON CONDITIONS
McIntosh v. Haynes'
McIntosh was incarcerated in the Missouri State Penitentiary in Jefferson City to serve a six-year term for a 1974 conviction of armed robbery.
While serving the sentence, McIntosh filed an original petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Missouri Supreme Court.2 He alleged that the
penitentiary building in which he slept was rat-infested and that confinement in that building constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the constitutions of Missouri and the United States.3 McIntosh and
1. 545 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. Section 532.030, RSMO 1969 requires that the petition for writ of habeas
corpus be filed initially in the circuit court of the county in which the petitioner is
restrained of his liberty. If the application for writ is refused by that court, the
prisoner may make successive applications to courts of superior jurisdiction.
§ 532.040, RSMo 1969; In re Breck, 252 Mo. 302, 158 S.W. 843 (1913). In McIntosh
the court noted that the original supreme court jurisdiction in this case was unusual, and that future petitions should be filed in the appropriate circuit court. 545
S.W.2d at 653.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; MO. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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two other occupants of the same building had been bitten by rats during
December, 1975, and January, 1976, and were forced to undergo a fourteen-shot anti-rabies vaccination program.
The writ of habeas corpus was issued and respondent Haynes, Director of the Division of Corrections, filed his return, requesting dismissal of
the writ and remand of the prisoner.4 Haynes argued that McIntosh's
petition should be dismissed because habeas corpus relief was limited to
challenging the cause of confinement, as opposed to the conditions of
confinement. Haynes argued that the writ should be dismissed because the
only available remedy under habeas corpus was release from confinement.
McIntosh admitted he was incarcerated legally and requested only a
change in the conditions of his confinement.5 Therefore, Haynes reasoned,
habeas corpus was an improper remedy.
The Missouri Supreme Court held that "a prisoner is entitled to utilize
habeas corpus to secure relief from inhumane conditions constituting cruel
and unusual punishment even though the detention itself is legal."6 The
court said that a summary dismissal of habeas corpus in all instances where
conditions of confinement are challenged would be improper. With this
procedural problem solved, the court held on the merits that McIntosh had
failed to prove cruel and unusual punishment. (The court emphasized the
Division of Corrections' subsequent vermin extermination efforts which
apparently had remedied the condition.) The writ was dismissed and
McIntosh was remanded to custody. This note first will consider briefly the
underpinnings of the McIntosh decision. It then will explore the effect of
the decision upon a prisoner's remedies for inhumane conditions of confinement and discuss the limited breadth of the habeas corpus expansion
by the Missouri court.
The writ of habeas corpus is the process of testing the authority of one
who deprives another of his liberty. It is designed to provide a person
whose liberty is restrained an immediate hearing to inquire into and deter4. A brief description of the habeas corpus procedure as set out in Chapter
532 of the Missouri Revised Statutes and rule 91 of the Missouri Rules of Civil
Procedure may be helpful. The aggrieved prisoner files a petition under oath in the
proper court. In the petition, the prisoner states the illegal aspects of his confinement. See note 2 supra. The court then grants the writ unless the allegations fail to
state a dlaim on which the prisoner can be granted relief. The writ is directed to the
officer in charge of the prisoner. This officer files a return, stating the reason for
the confinement, and the prisoner is turned over to the custody of the court. The
court hears testimony at a hearing and disposes of the prisoner "as the case shall
require." The prisoner is discharged, bailed, or otherwise relieved if the court finds
in his favor. Otherwise, he is remanded to the custody of the prison official.
Administrative action at any stage which cures the objectionable condition may
cause the writ to be quashed. 545 S.W.2d at 653.
5. Although the prisoner's petition contained language which made it appear
that the prisoner was seeking discharge from his confinement, the court said it was
"clear. . .that petitioner does not seek discharge from the department of corrections but only from being confined in a place infested with rats." 545 S.W.2d at 648.
6. Id. at 652.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/10
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mine the legality of the detention.7 Generally, a prisoner utilizes habeas
corpus to challenge some defect in the arrest or trial proceedings.8 He also
may employ habeas corpus to challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court or the sentencing procedure. In each of the above situations release
from custody is the desired remedy.
Traditionally, Missouri courts have refused to examine the conditions
of a prisoner's confinement (where the relief would be something other
than release) through the habeas corpus procedure.' Habeas corpus petitions in Missouri state courts which sought review of prison conditions were
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be grantedhabeas relief was not available unless the cause of confinement was challenged. 0 A prisoner dissatisfied with the conditions of his confinement
theoretically could gain relief at the state level through injunction, writs of
prohibition or mandamus, declaratory judgment, or through the state
administrative procedure act."
In McIntosh, however, the court apparently recognized the practical
ineffectiveness and procedural delay involved in these mechanisms. 2 The
7. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 2 (1976).
8. It should be noted that in Missouri most post-conviction review for prisoners is received through Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.26. Prisoners in Missouri employ rule
27.26, in lieu of habeas corpus, to challenge improper search and seizure, unlawfully coerced confessions or guilty pleas, inadequacy or denial of counsel, unfairness of
trial, etc. Few states have provisions comparable to Missouri's rule 27.26. Habeas
corpus is used to challenge the above defects in the trial proceedings in most states.
In Missouri, rule 27.26 is not available except to challenge defects in the trial
proceedings. The prisoner, if he has been convicted lawfully, must employ habeas
corpus to challenge conditions in his confinement.
9. Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
404 U.S. 249 (1971); Cavallaro v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1971).
10. Id.
11. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). The possible remedies in
federal court and state administrative remedies will be discussed infra.
12. The court recognized the "time-consuming procedures involved in a declaratory judgment action. .

. ."

545 S.W.2d at 653. The court indicated this delay

would not afford an inmate "reasonable relief from. . . confinement prior to being
severely injured by rats." Id. The court did not mention any other possible state
remedies, but cited Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). The Supreme
Court pointed out in that case that possible mandamus and injunction actions were
of only speculative value, and that there appeared to be no Missouri cases in which a
prisoner had utilized these remedies successfully in challenging prison conditions.
Courts in almost every jurisdiction have refused to give injunctive relief,
perhaps motivated by a desire to avoid the supervision problems of the equitable
decree. R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 450 (1973). Like an injunction, a writ of mandamus could provide speedy relief. However, it generally has not
been helpful to prisoners, largely because it is restricted to the ministerial (nondiscretionary) acts of government officials. § 529.010, RSMo 1969. Most prison
rules and practices involve discretion, thus they are beyond mandamus jurisdiction.
Section 222.010, RSMo 1969 states that a convict's civil rights are suspended while
in prison. This has worked to reduce further the availability of a prisoner's nonhabeas corpus remedies. For further discussion of an inmate's judicial remedies, see
R.

GOLDFARB &

L.

SINGER,

supra at 433-88.
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writ of habeas corpus, through its provisions for speedy hearing and
determination," gives a prisoner an opportunity to protest at the state level
allegedly inhumane conditions of confinement. The McIntosh court found
no statutory bar to the expansion of habeas corpus relief and recognized
the favored position which the "great writ" has maintained. 4 Following the
lead of some recent decisions in other states and the federal courts,15 the
court decided that a prisoner could employ habeas corpus to challenge the
conditions, as well as the cause of his confinement. Upon a finding that the
existing conditions are so inhumane as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, the court may order whatever relief is appropriate and neces6
sary to cure the defects in the prisoner's confinement.
An inmate in the Missouri prison system now has open two avenues of
habeas corpus relief to challenge conditions of his confinement which may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner first may apply for
habeas corpus relief in the state court. If the decision there is unsatisfactory, the prisoner, upon satisfaction of the exhaustion of state remedies
requirement, may petition for relief through a writ of habeas corpus in
17
federal court.
Where federal constitutional violations (such as cruel and unusual
punishment) are claimed, federal courts are not bound by the state court
determination of the federal legal issue-even if the state courts have
13. After petition by the inmate, the writ must be granted or denied by the
court "without delay." § 532.060, RSMo 1969. If the writ is granted, the officer in
charge of the confinement has twenty-four hours to file his return and produce the
prisoner before the court. §§ 532.170, .200, RSMo 1969. A hearing must be held
within five days of the filing of the return, unless the prisoner requests more time.
§ 532.310, RSMo 1969. A decision is made by the court after the hearing.
§ 532.360, RSMo 1969. The entire process can be completed in less than a week.
14. The court cited Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). "The writ
of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action."
15. See cases discussed in the majority opinion. 545 S.W.2d at 650-52.
16. Missouri statutes apparently allow the judge wide discretion in determining what relief is needed in a particular case. Section 532.010, RSMo 1969 says a
writ of habeas corpus is available except when "such person can be neither discharged nor bailed, or otherwise relieved ......
(emphasis added). The last two words
imply a broad range of possible relief, as does the final clause in § 532.360, RSMo
1969, which says that the judge, after the hearing, "shall dispose of the prisoner as
the case shall require." The judge in a case such as McIntosh v. Haynes apparently
could order whatever relief he deemed necessary to remedy the conditions.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)-(c) (1970) (a state prisoner must exhaust all
available state remedies before applying to the federal courts for habeas corpus).
For discussions of satisfaction of this requirement, see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1487-94, 1500-03 (2nd ed. 1973); Laubach, Exhaustion of State Remedies
as a Prerequisiteto FederalHabeas Corpus:A Summary, 1966-1971, 7 GONZ. L. REv. 34

(1971); Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:The Isolation Principle, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 78 (1964); Comment, Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1093 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/10

4

Ball: Ball: Habeas Corpus-Use of the Writ in Missouri State Courts
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

adjudicated the federal issue fully and fairly.'" Federal courts often defer
to the factual findings of state tribunals, 9 but even after a full hearing at
the state level, a prisoner may attempt to gain relief from the very same
conditions by convincing a federal court that the state court has misapplied
the federal standard of constitutionality.2 ° (Although this note is concerned
with the habeas corpus remedy, the reader should note the distinct possibility of prisoner relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1970).21 This provision,
18. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have
misconceived a federal constitutional right.
Id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963) reinforced this notion. Federal habeas corpus was seen as a procedure which
provides a remedy for any restraint considered contrary to fundamental rights. Id.
at 402.
19. In proper circumstances the federal court may hold its own evidentiary
hearing when reviewing a state prisoner's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970). If the
relevant facts have not been found in the state court, then the federal judge must
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts in the habeas corpus proceeding.
If, however, the state courts previously have ascertained the facts, a problem arises
as to the conditions which require the federal judge to permit relitigation of
relevant facts. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), set out criteria for
relitigation at the federal level. The Court said that there should be relitigation only
when there is some indication that the state processes have not dealt fairly or
completely with the issues. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1113 (1970).
20. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) the Supreme Court indicated that
it may be backing off the principle of federal habeas corpus review of all constitutional claims, even those fully and fairly litigated by the state court:
[w]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state
prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced
at his trial.
Id. at 482. The Court claimed that its decision narrowed federal habeas corpus
review only in fourth amendment search and seizure situations involving application of the exclusionary rule of evidence. However, the dissent foresaw further
cutbacks in federal habeas corpus review. "Today's holding portends substantial
evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction .

. . ."

Id. at 503. (Brennan, J.,

dissenting). It remains to be seen whether the Stone rationale will be expanded so as
to curtail federal habeas corpus review of fully and fairly litigated prisoner claims of
unconstitutional confinement. For justifications of federal review, see Comment,
Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1056-62
(1970).

21. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is becoming an increasingly popular
mechanism for redress of prisoner grievances.2 2)
The McIntosh opinion expands a prisoner's remedies, but it places at
least two limitations upon that expansion-an exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement and the adoption of an apparently narrow view of
the type of prison conditions which will be proper for habeas corpus
review. Each of these limitations will be considered.
Near the end of the McIntosh opinion the court states:
Nor do we intend that habeas corpus should be resorted to where
the conditions complained of can be remedied by administrative
action.

23

The court seems to be placing its own exhaustion of remedies limitation
upon habeas corpus review. Where administrative appeal is available, the
inmate would be required to seek relief at this level before being granted
judicial intervention. This requirement would apply to almost all com22. A prisoner often has a choice between § 1983 and federal or state habeas
corpus as a mechanism for challenging prison conditions and regulations. The
prisoner's decision requires a consideration of types of relief as well as the procedural and time consequences. An action under § 1983 includes the possibility of
class actions, broad equitable or legal relief, broad discovery procedures and circumvention of the exhaustion of state remedies requirement. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). However, a § 1983 action may not provide as speedy relief as a
habeas corpus action in state court. Also, conditions of confinement which violate a
state law or prison regulation, but do not result in the deprivation of a constitutional
right or are not attributable to the conduct or omission of some person acting under
color of law are not remediable under § 1983. In addition, notions of federalism or
federal-state comity may persuade a federal court not to exercise equitable jurisdiction (e.g., grant an injunction) in a matter of state or local concern, regardless of
the abridgement of constitutional rights. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Despite the above arguments, and because of the traditional reluctance of state
courts to provide adequate review of prison conditions and the exhaustion of
remedies requirement for federal habeas corpus, § 1983 actions in federal courts
have become increasingly effective vehicles for judicial review. Only when the state
remedy provides faster relief and state courts are receptive to prison complaints,
should a prisoner opt for state habeas corpus.
For a discussion of § 1983 and other remedies, see R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER,
AFTER CONVICTION 443 (1973); Turner, Establishingthe Rule of Law in Prisons:A
Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971); Annot., 51
A.L.R.3d 111, 128 (1973). It should be noted that there is some confusion over
whether § 1983 excuses exhaustion of state judicial and administrative remedies in
every case or only in those cases where application for relief through state channels
clearly would be futile. There has been some erosion of the "no exhaustion" rule,
especially to the extent of requiring exhaustion of available administrative remedies, but the extent of this erosion is unclear at this time. See Comment, Section 1983
Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1970); Comment, State Prisonersand
the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Section 1983 Jurisdictionand the Availability
of Adequate State Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 366, 376 (1976); Note, Limiting
the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969).
If an exhaustion requriement is included in § 1983, this would put a severe blemish
on the attractiveness of a § 1983 action to challenge prison conditions.

23. 545 S.W.2d at 654.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/10
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plaints against the Division of Corrections because that state-wide office has
a grievance procedure 24 which is available for any condition affecting an
inmate which he believes is "unjust, inequitable, a hindrance to effective
operation, or creates a problem." 2 It is probable that many complaints,
including the situation in McIntosh, could be resolved through the grievance procedure.
The multi-level grievance procedure is highlighted by a potential final
determination by a citizens' review committee consisting of individuals who
are not associated with the institution. 2 On its face, the grievance procedure appears to be in line with modern processes in other states27 and
appears to provide an adequate initial review for aggrieved inmates. The
practical operation of the procedure should be analyzed from time to time
to insure that the procedure really does provide adequate protection.
Particular attention should be paid to the time element so the procedure is
not allowed to drag out indefinitely, entangling the inmate in administrative red tape.2" It should be noted that the grievance procedure is available
only to those incarcerated in state institutions. Prisoners in county or
municipal facilities must rely upon a statutory plan of prison review. 29 This
administrative appeal also should be analyzed in terms of effectiveness
before the court elects to adhere rigidly to exhaustion of administrative
remedies as a prerequisite for habeas corpus review.
In addition to the exhaustion requirement, the court in McIntosh
limited its expansion of habeas corpus review by defining narrowly the
substantive quality of complaints for which habeas corpus relief will be
24. The inmate grievance procedure, promulgated pursuant to §§ 216.020,
.115, RSMo 1969, became effective only last year. The procedure is set out at Mo.
Div. CORRECTIONS R. 101.120 (1976).
25. Mo. Div. CORRECTIONS R. 101.120 (1976).

26. Id. The inmate begins the complaint procedure with his caseworker and
works through the grievance "team," the prison warden and the Director of the
Division of Corrections. The director may refer the complaint to a citizens review
committee which makes a recommendation, after which the director makes his
determination. If this does not resolve the matter to the inmate's satisfaction, he
may have it referred again to the citizens review committee which may make any
resolution consistent with law and departmental policy. Thus the board apparently
has only possible, not absolute, power to overrule the director's decision.
27. For a comparison, see Comment, State Prisoners and the Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies: Section 1983 Jurisdictionand the Availability of Adequate State
Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 366, 403-09 (1976).
28. Mo. DIV. CORRECTIONS R. 101.120(5) (1976) sets out the time limits for

each step of the procedure. A complaint which moves through each stage theoretically might not reach a final determination for more than two months after its initial
filing.
29. Section 221.320, RSMo 1969 provides for a board of visitors which is to
visit jails periodically and make yearly reports to the division of welfare on the
conditions in jails. Presumably a prisoner with a complaint about a county jail would
be required to appeal for relief to the person in charge of the jail and a member of
the board of visitors before he could be said to have exhausted his administrative
remedies.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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proper. The decision plainly indicates that a writ of habeas corpus in state
court will not be an appropriate mechanism to gain review of all prison
conditions. The writ will be proper only in those situations where a prisoner alleges "specific facts which, if true, would constitute inhumane conditions constituting cruel and unusual punishment ... ."o Recognizing that
the day-to-day operations of penal and correctional institutions are under
the auspices of the executive department, the court indicated it would not
interfere with the discretion of administrators in "the conduct, management, and disciplinary control of this type of institution except in extreme
cases." Thus, in cases not involving "inhumane" conditions, an inmate's
avenues for judicial relief apparently will be limited, as they were before
McIntosh, to writs of habeas corpus in federal court, actions under section
1983, or the historically ineffective injunction, mandamus and declaratory
judgment procedures in state courts." The speedy relief that state habeas
corpus could provide will not be available. Petitions in state court which do
not allege "inhumane" conditions may, as before, be dismissed summarily.
Prisoner complaints can be divided into two categories: those where
the prisoner is claiming cruel and unusual punishment in the strictest sense
due to unsafe or unsanitary living conditions or physical abuse by the
administrators or other inmates; and those which do not involve a threat to
the health of the prisoner, i.e., where the prisoner is claiming that certain
regulations deny him his constitutional rights. In the latter category, the
violation can constitute a form of cruel and unusual punishment or a direct
violation of other constitutional provisions. However, the chief characteristic of this category is that no threat to the physical well-being of the
inmate is involved.
The facts in McIntosh place it in the former category. The court's
decision indicates a willingness to intervene judicially where prisons become severely overcrowded, unhealthy, or dangerous. The court apparently has refused to extend the scope of habeas corpus review to those
situations where there is no threat to physical well-being. There are at least
two factors which indicate this refusal. First, the court speaks repeatedly of
"inhumane" conditions as the test for what constitutes a proper area for
habeas corpus relief. It is doubtful that an abridgement of free speech or
freedom of religion could be called "inhumane" so as to become a proper
ground for habeas corpus review under the McIntosh guidelines. By the
30. 545 S.W.2d at 653 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 652-53.
32. In Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the Supreme Court said
that if state remedies were of only speculative effectiveness, then a prisoner need
not exhaust all state remedies before pursuing federal habeas corpus. Since McIntosh v. Haynes does not appear to improve an inmate's state-court remedies in
situations not involving inhumane treatment, the Wilwording rationale probably is
still applicable to these situations, and a prisoner could gain relief through federal
habeas corpus without complete exhaustion of injunction, mandamus, and other
state remedies which are of questionable effectiveness.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/10
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"inhumane" limitation, the court must be contemplating those prison conditions which pose a threat of physical harm to the inmate. A condition
which merely infringes upon personal liberty probably should not be considered "inhumane" within the meaning of McIntosh.
The second factor which indicates the court's reluctance to expand
habeas corpus to all prisoner complaints is evidenced by a comparison of
the McIntosh opinion to an earlier majority opinion in the same case. That
opinion was withdrawn and the unanimous decision involved here was
substituted. In the earlier opinion the court said habeas corpus relief
should be availabe whenever an individual is "restrained of his liberty to a
greater degree than authorized by law." 4 This broad phrase invited expansion of habeas corpus review to situations not involving physical mistreatment. The holding in the new opinion, i.e., that habeas corpus may be
utilized "to secure relief for inhumane conditions constituting cruel and
unusual punishment, 3 1 is more narrow and apparently indicates a desire
on the part of the court to foreclose expansion of the habeas corpus
remedy, at least for the present.
By limiting its expansion of habeas corpus, the Missouri court demonstrated a reluctance to follow a recent trend in some jurisductions where
the concept of cruel and unusual punishment has been expanded to include all unreasonable or unjustifiable deprivations of prisoners' rights.
These courts have recognized that a prisoner should retain all rights of a
normal citizen except those necessary for the administration of the correctional institution. The courts have employed habeas corpus or actions
under section 1983 to review situations involving deprivation of personal
liberties. For example, regulations and practices which inhibit religious
freedom,3 6 require mail censorship or visitor limitations,3 7 violate the right
to counsel or access to the courts,3 8 eliminate procedural due process
33. McIntosh v. Haynes, No. 59477 (Mo. En Banc, Dec. 30, 1976).
34. Id. This also is the wording of the statutory provision for habeas corpus.
§ 532.010, RSMo 1969. In the second McIntosh opinion, the court does not mention
this phrase and opts for more narrow language.
35. 545 S.W.2d at 652.
36. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d 1
(2d Cir. 1964); Glenn v. Wilkinson, 309 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Peek v.
Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Burns v. Swenson, 288 F. Supp. 4
(W.D. Mo. 1968), modified, 300 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 771
(8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); State v. Richardson, 130 N.J.
Super. 63, 324 A.2d 914 (1974); SaMarion v. McGinnis, 35 App. Div. 684, 314
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Battle v.
Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp.
1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp.
544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973),judgment
vacated, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974); State ex rel. Thomas v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 343,
198 N.W.2d 675 (1972).
38. See, e.g., Jenks v. Henys, 378 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1967); Lamar v. Kern, 349
F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Morales v. Turman, 326 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Tex.
1971); Glenn v. Wilkinson, 309 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Fulwood v. ClemPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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protections in disciplinary proceedings,39 promote racial discrimination,"
or restrict the right to speak and read freely41 have gained complete
judicial review through these procedures. Courts have granted relief in
many instances (even though no physical suffering or "inhumaneness" was
involved 42) by holding the prison rules or practices unconstitutional as
43
cruel and unusual punishment.
In instances where the infringement of personal liberties was necessary or inconsequential, these same courts have deferred to the judgment
of prison administrators and have refused judicial relief or have limited the
breadth of judicial review. For example, hair-length regulations, restrictions on the number of books a prisoner may keep in his cell, and
restrictions on some free speech rights have been upheld as necessary to
some penal or correctional purpose.4 4 The line between situations which
mer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); In re Jordan, 12 Cal. 3d 575, 526 P.2d 523,
116 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1974); Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227 N.E.2d 383
(1967).
39. See, e.g., Capitan v. Cupp, 356 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1972); Stewart v.
Jozwiak, 346 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp.
767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Meola v. Fitzpatrick,
322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966
(M.D. Pa. 1971).
40. See, eg,, Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Rivers v.
Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Holt v. Sarver (Holt 1I), 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp.
1005 (N.D. Ga.), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 266 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971); Jackson v.
Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D.
Neb.), affl'd, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
42. It has been settled for some time in federal courts that physical suffering
by an inmate is not a prerequisite of an eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment claim. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1968). In McIntosh the Missouri court apparently has limited the cruel
and unusual punishment concept to situations involving inhumane conditions or
treatment, but it declined to give any specific test. 545 S.W.2d at 653.
43. The tests for cruel and unusual punishment are largely broad and vague.
Courts forbid prison conditions which are so inherently cruel that they transcend
elemental concepts of decency, Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971), or
"[shock the] general conscience," Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965). In
addition, when the prison discipline can be said to be disproportionate to the
offense, or when the prison regulation is not justified sufficiently by legitimate
penal purposes, or is unnecessarily arbitrary, some courts have declared the practice invalid as in violation of the eighth amendment. See Comment, The Inadequacy
of Prisoners'Rights to Provide Sufficient Protectionfor Those Confined in Penal Institutions, 48 N.C.L. REV. 847, 870 (1970).
44. See, e.g., Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 915 (1969) (physical harm permissible to prevent rioting and destruction of
property-chemical mace allowed if necessary in discretion of prison officials);
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1966)
(inmate's first amendment rights such as free speech may be limited severely
because of the incendiary potential in tie prison setting); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d
483 (8th Cir. 1965); Black v. Pryse, 315 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1970), affl'd, 444
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/10
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are proper for judicial review and those which are deemed to be beyond
the proper reach of the courts have been difficult to draw, particularly as
the regulations become related more closely to daily prison administration.
The Missouri court apparently has decided not to attempt to draw that
line. This is indicated by its decision that habeas corpus is appropriate only
where "inhumane" conditions are alleged. This reluctance to intrude into
an area of prison administration is reminiscent of the "hands off" doctrine4 --a judicially-promulgated doctrine utilized by some courts to avoid
review of any prison conditions. The courts simply denied jurisdiction or
granted great deference to the discretion of prison officials. The doctrine
was justified through theories that the judiciary lacked the necessary expertise in penology, that judicial intervention could disrupt prison discipline, that opening the courts to prisoner complaints could precipitate a
flood of litigation, and that constitutional provisions for separation of
powers should constrain the judicial branch from exercising any jurisdiction in a matter of executive and legislative concern. 4' Despite the
almost uniform rejection of this doctrine by the courts, it is likely that at
least some of these justifications motivated the Missouri court to limit the
expansion of habeas corpus.
It is obvious that judicial intervention through habeas corpus in every
aspect of prison life would be undesirable. Incarceration necessarily involves many restraints on personal liberties. Prison officials must be given
wide discretion in operating penal and correctional facilities to meet the
needs of both inmates and society. It also is obvious that judicial review
should be available to a prisoner when conditions become so abhorrent as
to place the inmate in danger of physical harm. The McIntosh decision is
indicative of the Missouri court's willingness to intervene in these situations.
However, the holding in McIntosh apparently means that a prisoner
whose individual rights are abridged unreasonably, but without physical
suffering, will have no effective judicial remedy at the state level. It is
evident that the court is attempting to strike a balance between the discretion of prison administrators and unconstitutional imperfections which
F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1971) (hair-length regulation upheld because it is designed to
prevent hygienic problems and concealment of weapons); Beishir v. Swenson, 331
F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (prison officials may limit the number of books and magazines that a prisoner
is allowed to keep in his cell); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967).
45. For a history of the "hands off" doctrine, see Comment, Beyond the Ken of
the Courts: A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review the Complaintsof Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963) (for cases espousing the doctrine, see Id. at 508 n.12); Note,
ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners:The DevelopingLaw, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962).
46. For discussion of these justifications, see R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER
CONVICTION 364 (1973); Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial
Responsibility, 53 OR. L. REV. 29, 38-45 (1973); Comment, Overcrowding in Prisons
and Jails: Maryland Faces a CorrectionalCrisis, 36 MD. L. REV. 182, 186 (1976).
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must be cured by judicial intervention. This balance should not be struck so
as to eliminate, as a practical matter, all state court review of prison
regulations which unnecessarily deprive an inmate of his constitutional
rights. A prisoner should not be forced to go to federal court to protect
these rights, yet that appears to be the result of the McIntosh decision.
Summary dismissal of state-court habeas corpus petitions not involving
"inhumane" conditions now is permitted.
New and more liberal prison rules4 7 and the modern grievance procedure discussed above may eliminate many prisoner complaints. However,
deprivations of personal liberties may arise which cannot be justified by
any legitimate penal purpose and cannot be resolved through the grievance procedure. In such situations judicial relief at the state level should be
available-the possibility of increased litigation or separation of powers
arguments to the contrary nontwithstanding. The possibility of increased
litigation is not sufficient justification for an abrogation by the Missouri
courts of their responsibility to protect citizens from unlawful deprivations
of constitutional rights. Nor should the fact that prison administration is an
executive function constrain the judicial branch from reviewing alleged
deprivations of personal liberties. Federal courts should not be burdened
with the judicial supervision of the rules and conditions in Missouri's
prisons simply because the Missouri courts refuse to review certain prisoner complaints. A prisoner should not be forced to resort to federal habeas
corpus or section 1983 remedies which may not possess
the potential for
48
prompt relief that is inherent in state habeas corpus.
Certainly the review by the state court should include proper deference to the discretion of administrators, and a prisoner first should be
required to pursue remedies within the prison system. However, where
administrative remedies are ineffective, the prisoner should have an adequate judicial remedy. The existing state court procedures-mandamus,
injunction, declaratory judgment-have proved inadequate; therefore, a
further expansion of state habeas corpus is the most effective vehicle for
providing an inmate with speedy judicial review. The state habeas corpus
remedy should be expanded beyond McIntosh, as it has been in other
jurisdictions, to provide a remedy for review of the unjustifiable restriction
of any constitutional right of a prisoner, even though "inhumaneness" is
not involved.
DAN H.

BALL

47. In conjunction with the modern grievance procedure the Division of
Corrections recently adopted a new set of rules governing inmate discipline, mail,
telephone and visitor privileges, imposition of solitary confinement, and the like.
Mo. Div. CORRECTIONS R. 104.010-.120 (1976). Through provisions for a hearing
before disciplinary action is taken and through less rigid rules in other areas, the
division may avoid many complaints which have arisen in other jurisdictions where
the rules are more strict. Note that each of these rules may be challenged through
the grievance procedure, but, like the grievance procedure, the rules are applicable
only to state correctional facilities and not to those at the city and county level.
48. State and federal remedies are compared briefly in note 20 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/10
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